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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
will affirm the decisions of the lower federal courts and declare
securties to be subjects of interstate commerce.
What will the Supreme Court decide if it is faced with the task
of determining the validity of the Securities Act of 1933? That
is a question which this writer will not assume to answer. It can
be said, nevertheless, that the court, if it so desires, would find no
difficulty in affirming the Act as being within the power of Con-
gress to regulate commerce among the states. Gibbons v. Ogden,
the Pigg Case, and the decisions of the inferior federal courts de-
fine commerce to be intercourse, so as to include the sale, offer to
sell, and transportation of securities. On the basis of the Lot-
tery Case, the transportation of securities is traffic subject to
federal control. These authorities should prevail over Paul v.
Virginia and Nathan v. Louisiana since those cases have been dis-
tinguished on other grounds.
HERMAN GORALNIK, '35.
CIVIL LIABILITIES UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933
The purchaser of a misrepresented security, who suffers a loss
thereby, would naturally hold certain groups of persons morally
responsible for his having been injured. These groups would
usually include the issuer, the underwriters, the persons or insti-
tutions assisting the underwriter in distributing the security, and
the salesman from whom the security was purchased. The
actions available to such an injured party at common law were
limited to an action at law in fraud and deceit and a proceeding in
equity to rescind the contract of purchase. The nature of these
actions necessarily restricted the number of persons against
whom the purchaser could recover. In England legislation has
extended this group, and it is with this background of experience
that Congress has enacted the Securities Act of 1933.1
In an action for fraud and deceit the burden was upon the
plaintiff2 to prove that the defendant made a material misrepre-
sentation with knowledge that it was false, or made it recklessly
without regard to its truth, and that the plaintiff relied 3 upon the
1 
"The committee is fortified in these sections (secs. 11 and 12) by similar
safeguards in the English Companies Act of 1929. What is deemed neces-
sary for sound financing in conservative England ought not to be unneces-
sary for the more feverish pace which American finance has developed."
'73d Congress, 1st Sess. House Report No. 85, p. 9.
2 2 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) par. 349.
B Eut a defendant is liable when the public is to be influenced to act by the
representation: Paddock v. Fletcher (1869) 42 Vt. 389; Terwiliger v. Gt.
Western Tel. Co. (1873) 59 Ill. 249.
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statement and suffered injury thereby. It was, therefore, com-
paratively easy for an astute securities salesman to defend him-
self in such a suit because all he had to prove was one of the fol-
lowing sets of facts: (1) That the plaintiff knew of the mis-
statement or should have known as a reasonable person ;4 (2)
that the plaintiff did not rely upon the misstatement;5 (3) that
the misstatement was not a material one ;6 or (4) that the defend-
ant did not know of the untruth of the statement 7 or act carelessly
in not ascertaining the untruth.8 The problem thus arose how to
protect the investor not only from the actual misrepresentations
of a salesman, but also from the statements made in a prospectus
by promoters or directors of a corporation which was about to
issue a security. Normally there were no actual misrepresenta-
tions in the prospectus, but there might not be a full disclosure of
facts which would give an entirely different outlook to the security
from an investor's point of view. Such facts should be made
known to the investor in order for him not to be misled into mak-
ing a poor investment.
In 1889 the English court, in the celebrated case of Derry v.
Peek,9 decided that a director of a company, issuing a prospectus,
was not liable for false statements that were negligently made in
the prospectus. The following year Parliament passed the Di-
rectors' Liability Actlo by which a director was made liable for
material" misrepresentations that were made, unless it could be
shown that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the state-
ments were true. This same liability has been preserved in all the
subsequent English Companies Acts. 12 Thus the burden was
placed upon the directors of corporations to be careful as to what
was in the prospectus.
412 R. C. L., par. 10, Farrar v. Churchill (1890) 135 U. S. 609; Morris v.
McMahan (1898) 75 Mo. App. 494; McFarland v. Carlsbad Hot Springs
Sanitarium Co. et al. (1913) 68 Ore. 530, 137 Pac. 209, Ann. Cas. (1915)
C. 555.
5None has a right to rely upon representations but those to whose in-
fluence whose actions they were made. See: Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank
(1902) 112 Fed. 931, and Henry v. Dennis (1901) 95 Me. 24; 49 A. 58.
6 2 Cooley on Torts (4th ed.) par. 362, and cases cited.
Ibid., par. 348. Plaintiff must show material misrepresentation.
s Cf. Taylor v. Ashton (1843) 11 M. and W. 401, 152 Eng. Rep. 860, and
Beebe v. Knapp (1873) 28 Mich. 53.
9 (L. R.) 14 A. C. 337.
10 Directors' Liability Act 1890 (52 and 54 Vict., ch. 64).
11 The English courts have held that where "material" contracts are re-
quired to be stated in the prospectus, any contract that would be likely to in-
fluence the judgment of an intending applicant as to whether or not he
should take up the shares would be deemed material. Sullivan v. Metcalf
(1880)5 C. P. Div. 455; Twycross v. Grant (1877), L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 409;
Cackett v. Keswick (1902) 2 Ch. 456.
12 Companies Act 1929 (19 and 20 Geo. 5 c. 23) s. 37.
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Parliament, however, soon discovered that this liability alone
was not sufficient to deter the issuing of securities which were
really unsafe for -the public to purchase as an investment. There
were, therefore, further stringent regulations imposed upon those
issuing a prospectus,13 or in case a prospectus was not to be used,
upon those filing statements with the registrar.14 These regula-
tions consisted of requiring facts as to the promoting and organi-
zation of the company, the shares of stock authorized, commis-
sions paid to promoters, interest of directors in property pur-
chased by the company, amount of paid in shares, to what use and
extent the sums received from the issue will be utilized, and
many other facts which were formerly known only to the men
organizing the company.' 5 A misstatement or failure to state a
material fact 6 required to be stated in the prospectus or state-
ment filed with the registrar, would make the director or pro-
motor, or any other person authorizing the issuance of the pros-
pectus, liable for the damages17 sustained by any person sub-
scribing to the issue who had relied' s upon the prospectus or
statement. These same persons were also made liable to a fine
for not only having made fraudulent' 9 misstatements of material
facts, but also for failure to state material facts that were required
by the act to be stated in the prospectus.20
Under the English Companies Act the subscriber to shares
under the prospectus was the only person who could hold the
director or the promotor liable.21 Furthermore, it was neces-
23 Ibid., Sched. IV, parts 1, 2 and 3.
'4 Ibid., Sched. III.
25 See notes 13 and 14.
1 In an action to hold a subscriber the court held: That the mere reference
to an important contract was not true notice of the contract. One should
look at the entire prospectus together to see if it is fraudulent. Aarons
Reef v. Twiss (1896) A. C. 273. In the case of Greenwood v. Leather Shod
Wheel Co. (1900) 1 Ch. 421 (C. A.) the court held that disclosure under
the Companies Act cannot be evaded by a general waiver clause in the pros-
pectus or the contract to take shares.
27Companies Act 1929. (19 and 20 Geo. 5, c. 23) s. 37 (1) (a), (b),
(c), (d).i8bid., s. 37. (1)--"Shall be liable to all persons who subscribe for any
shares or debentures on the faith. of . .
19 Ibid., s. 35.
20 In the famous case of Rex. v. Kylsant (1931) 1 K. B. 442, the court
held a director liable under the Larceny Act 1861 (24 and 25 Viet. c. 96)
s. 84, for wilful failure to state material facts. This extended the lia-
bility that was under the Companies Act (supra) n. 18.
21 Companies Act 1929 (19 and 20 Geo. 5 c. 23) s. 37 d. See also Peek v.
Gurney (1873) L. R. 6 H. L. 377, wherein the court held that prospectus
was not addressed to persons who may read it and buy shares in the open
market on the faith of it. But this does not apply where the prospectus was
used to induce a person to take shares in the open market. Andrews v.
Mockford (1896) 1 Q. B. 372.
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sary that the plaintiff have relied upon the misstatement or omis-
sion of fact in the prospectus. 22
These legislative enactments shifted the burden of proof upon
the defendant in such cases. The defendant was liable unless
he could prove: (1) That the plaintiff did not rely upon the mis-
statement; (2) that there was no misstatement; or (3) that the
defendant believed that the statements were true and had rea-
sonable2 3 grounds for such belief. There were also other de-
fenses such as that the defendant had removed his name from
the prospectus as soon as he had learned of the misstatement
and gave due notice of the removal; that his name was used with-
out his consent; that he had withdrawn his name before the is-
suance of the prospectus; and that the statements were those of
experts which he had reasonable ground to believe and did be-
lieve to be true.24
Under the English Companies Act of 1929 there is a provision
that there may be contribution among all those who are responsi-
ble for the issuing of the prospectus,2 5 thus changing the former
rule that contribution among joint tort-feasors is not permis-
sible. 26
From this brief sketch it can be seen that there has been an
active effort on the part of Parliament to restrict the issuance of
fraudulent securities. The grounds upon which an action against
a person misleading others as to the purchase of securities might
be maintained were broadened over a period of years.
In the United States there have been many attempts to regulate
the issuance of securities. These attempts have consisted mainly
of the passage of State "Blue Sky" laws.2 7 Despite these ef-
22 See note 21 above as to Companies Act.
25 The English courts have refrained from giving an exact definition of
reasonable, but they have held, for instance, that the mere reliance upon a
statement of a manager or co-director by another director signing the pros-
pectus was not reasonable grounds for belief. Adams v. Thrift (1915) 2
Ch. 21. (This might have an effect upon the American courts when they are
called upon to decide whether or not a director had reasonable grounds for
belief-see section 11, Securities Act of 1933.)
24 Companies Act 1929 (19 and 20 Geo. 5 c. 23) s. 37 (d i-iv).
25 Ibid., s. 37 (3).
20 Cf. Gerson v. Simpson (1903) 2 K. B. 197.
27 Delaware and Nevada are the only two states that have not passed
"Blue Sky" laws. There have been several attempts to pass federal laws
regulating the sale of securities, but the only regulation by the federal
government prior to the enactment of the Security Act of 1933 was by means
of the Postal Fraud Act. U. S. C. A. Title 18, par. 338. Cf. Ashby, "Federal
Regulation of Securities Sales," (1928) 22 Ill. Law Rev. 635; and Thompson,
"Regulation of Security Sales in Interstate Commerce," 1923, 9 A. B. A. J.,
157.
Sed vide 12 R. C. L. 347, par. 102: "It is sometimes declared that in actions
for damages for false representation it is not necessary to allege or prove
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forts, as President Roosevelt said in his message to the Seventy-
Third Congress, "... the public has sustained severe losses
through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many
persons and corporations selling securities." In actions for
fraud and deceit many states have followed the decision of Derry
v. Peek.2s Recovery would be denied unless a person could prove
fraud on the part of the defendant. 29 Scienter was one of the
necessary elements of the action.30 The burden was still upon the
plaintiff to prove all the allegations necessary to support a com-
mon-law action of fraud and deceit.3 ' The Securities Act of
1933 was passed to remedy this situation.
Congress relied upon the precedents set by Parliament in the
English Companies Act of 1929,32 both as to the requirements
that should be stated in the prospectus or registration statement
and as to the civil liabilities imposed. There are two main di-
visions of civil liability arising under the Act. The first 33 is the
liability arising from making a false registration statement, the
second34 is the liability imposed upon persons who have violated
section 5 of the Securities Act,3 or who have used false pros-
pectuses or made false oral representations through the mails
or in interstate commerce in order to sell securities.
scienter, or that the the representations were recklessly made in conscious
ignorance of whether they were true or not, but that it is sufficient if the
representations were false in fact, and that the defendant may be liable for
damages because of them even though he did not know they were untrue."
See also: Carter v. Glass (1880) 44 Mich. 154, 6 N. W. 200; Genner v.
Mosher (1899) 58 Neb. 135, 78 N. W. 384, 46 L. R. A. 244; Foster v. Kennedy
(1862) 38 Ala. 359; Aldrich v. Scribner (1912) 154 Mich. 23, 117 N. W.
581,18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379; Westerman v. Corder 1912, 86 Kan. 239, 119 Pac.
868, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 160.
28 See above note 9.
29 "Mere ignorance, or negligence, or stupidity on the part of the persons
making the representations does not constitute fraud if he intends honestly
to tell the truth, although his statements understood according to their seem-
ing meaning may be ever so misleading." Kountze v. Kennedy (1895) 147
N. Y. 124,41 N. E. 414,29 L. R. A. 360.
30Peters v. Lohman (1913) 171 Mo. App. 465, 156 S. W. 783; Reno v.
Bull (1916) 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144. Knowledge presumed, see 12
R. C. L. 335 and cases cited. Cf. Jeremiah Smith, "Liability for Negligent
Language," (1900) 14 Harv. Law Rev. 184. English equity courts find fraud
without mens rea, see Nocton v. Ashburton (1914) H. L. A. C. 932. See also
12 R. C. L. 347, par. 102.
31 Fraud is never presumed and the party alleging and relying upon it
must prove it. Hoeller v. Haffner (1900) 155 Mo. 56, 56 S. W. 312; Bowden
v. Bowden (1874) 75 Ill. 143.
32 Cf. 73d Cong., 1st Sess. Senate, Report No. 47, p. 5; 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. H. R., Report No. 85, p. 9.
33 May 27, 1933, c. 38. Title 1, par. 11.
35 Ibid., par. 12.
35 May 27, 1933, c. 38. Title 1, par. 5. This section makes it unlawful:
1. To use any means of communication or transportation in interstate com-
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The Securities Act requires that where securities are to be sold
in interstate commerce, a registration statement must be filed
with the Federal Trade Commission.34 This statement must con-
tain some thirty-two different facts regarding the organization
of the issuing company :37 the directors, salaries of over $25,000
commissions to be paid for underwriting, etc. There are certain
securities that are exempt from this provision, such as state and
governmental securities, short-term banking transactions, se-
curities of building and loan associations, common-carrier securi-
ties, and others;38 and, therefore the liabilities arising from
the making of a false registration statement do not apply. But
all kinds of securities are covered under the second division of
liability mentioned above.39
Section 11 of the Securities Act allows any person acquiring a
security which should have been registered to bring an action
provided that he does so in good faith if he establishes one of the
following groups of facts:
1. That there has been a misstatement of a material fact
in the registration statement.
2. That there has been an omission 40 to state a material
fact required to be stated in the registration statement.
3. That there has been a failure to state a material fact
which would be necessary to prevent other statements from
being misleading.
The liabilities under this section extend to the issuers, directors,
or persons named as about to become directors, partners, or per-
merce, or the mails, for selling securities for which a registration statement
has not been duly filed. 2. To send such a security through interstate com-
merce or the mails after sale. 3. To use mails or instruments of interstate
commerce to carry a prospectus of a security unless the same complies with
the regulations set forth in sec. 10 of this Act. 4. To send a security for sale
or for delivery after sale through interstate commerce or the mails which
has not been preceded by a prospectus in accordance with sec. 10 of this Act.
Par. 5 is not to be interpreted as to include sales of securities which sale
takes place entirely through intra-state transactions.
'o Ibid., par. 6.
'2 Ibid., schedules A and B.
's Ibid., par. 3. This paragraph sets forth all the exempted securities.
9g Ibid., par. 12.
40 At common law mere non-disclosure was not actionable, that is a com-
plete failure to give any facts as to the matter in question; Keats v. Earl of
Cadogen (1851) 10 C. B. 591; but see New Brunswick v. Muggeridge (1860)
1 Dr. and Sm. 383, 62 Eng. Rep. 418, where the court held, in an action to en-
force a contract, that a person contracting to take shares on the statements
in a prospectus has a right not only not to be misled by any statements
actually false, but also to be informed of all the facts the knowledge of which
might reasonably have deterred him from so contracting. (This is known
as the "Golden Rule" for prospectuses.)
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sons named as about to become partners, underwriters, and ex-
perts41 whose signed statements are in the registration statement.
The following are the defenses available to the above :42
1. To the issuer: That the plaintiff knew of the misstate-
ment or omission at the time of acquiring the security. (This
practically makes the issuer an insurer of the statements in
the registration statement.)
2. To those other than the issuer excluding experts: (a)
That the plaintiff knew of the misstatement or omission,
before acquiring the security. (b) That he had resigned
from his position as director, etc., prior to the effective date
of registration, and that due notice was given the public. (c)
Lack of notice or knowledge of the fact that he was named in
the registration statement. (d) Reasonable ground to be-
lieve and that he did believe in the truth and accuracy of the
registration statement.
3. To experts: (a) Same as 2 (a). (b) Defendant actu-
ally believed in the statement made, that there were reason-
able grounds for that belief, and that there was reasonable
investigation as basis for that belief. (c) The defective part
of the registration statement was not fairly representative of
his statement. (d) Defective statement was not a fair copy
or extract of the report or valuation.
Under section 11 there is a right of contribution.4 among those
liable under that section, and the duty of reasonableness imposed
upon those making the registration statement is that of a person
in a fiduciary capacity. 44
A plaintiff endeavoring to recover under section 12 need only
prove either that there has been a violation of section 5,45 and that
the defendant had sold him the security in violation thereof, or in
cases where the seller has used a prospectus or an oral communi-
41 Glanzer v. Shepard (1912) 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, 23 A. L. R.
1425, held that a weigher was liable for his negligence when he knew that a
third person would rely upon his statements.. This extended the rule that
had been layed down in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co. (1916) 217 N. Y.
393, 111 N. E. 1050. But in the case of Ultramares v. Touche (1931) 255
N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, 74 A. L. R. 1139, it was held that liability should not
be extended to accountants even though they were grossly negligent and
knew that some third person would rely upon their statements because such
a great liability would be against public policy. Thus we can readily see
that this act has gone far in extending liability for negligence.42May 27,1933, c. 38. Title 1, par. 11 (b).48 May 27, 1933, c. 38. Title 1, par. 11 (f).
44 Ibid., par. 11 (c). As to the nature of fiduciary duty see American Re-
statement of the Law of Trusts, sec. 169. Also see Harvard College v.
Amory (1830) 9 Pick (Mass.) 446, and King v. Talbot (1869) 40 N. Y. 76.
45 See above note 35.
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cation in the mails or interstate commerce, the plaintiff need only
show that that was a misstatement of a material fact or an
omission to state a material fact which under the circumstances
was necessary to prevent the prospectus from being misleading. 46
Under both sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act the plain-
tiff can recover the damages sustained in case he no longer has
the security, or upon returning the security he may recover the
purchase price with interest, less the amount of income that had
been paid on the security,47 provided, however, that under no
circumstances, in so far as section 11 is concerned, 48 should the
plaintiff be allowed to recover more than the amount at which the
security was offered to the public.
There are some differences between sections 11 and 12. Under
the former any person acquiring the security in good faith, may
recover from the persons specified as being liable, while under the
latter only the purchaser may recover and then only from any
seller of the security. Again in section 11 there are certain se-
curities that are exempted, while under section 12 the liability
applies to all securities.
Under section 15 of the Securities Act, liability under sections
11 and 12 is extended to persons, who through control of other
persons, or through control of the majority of stock of a cor-
poration, cause the agents of the corporation to violate those
sections. This is an extension of liability of stockholders beyond
that of the common law. 49 The corporate entity is disregarded,
and those behind it are made liable.
Although Congress has followed the general plan of liabilities
that is found in the English Companies Act of 1929, it is of inter-
est to notice the changes that have been made.
The English law does not allow recovery to anyone but the
subscriber to the stock, while in section 11 the plaintiff need only
be an acquirer in good faith of the security. Again in the Eng-
46 May 27, 1933, c. 38. Title 1, par. 11 (e), par. 12 (2).
47 Ibid., par. 11 (g).4 8 Ibid., par. 12 (2).
' Stockholders have been made liable in deceit for making untrue state-
ments to a creditor, Ver Wys v. Vander Mey (1919) 206 Mich. 499, 173
N. W. 504; Barnard Mfg. Co. v. Ralston Milling Co. (1913) 71 Wash. 659,
129 Pac. 389; but usually the stockholder was not liable for the torts of the
corporation, the corporation being considered an entity in and of itself, unless
statute provides otherwise. 14 C. J., pp. 949-950, 990-991. Generally
speaking, a stockholder, not an officer, and in no way connected with
the management of the corporate business, cannot be held personally re-
sponsible for the torts of the corporation. 7 Thompson, Corporations (3rd
ed.), par. 5438. But the Circuit Court of U. S. has held that the entity
can be disregarded when it is used merely for the purpose of committing
fraud on the law, United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Co. (1905) 142
Fed. 247.
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lish law it is necessary that the plaintiff have relied upon the
prospectus or the statement filed with the registrar, while under
the Securities Act the mere fact that a person bought a security,
coupled with the fact that there was a falsity in the registration
statement or prospectus, gives rise to an action. Whereas the
English courts have interpreted omissions of material facts to
be a basis for liability under the companies act, Congress has in-
cluded omissions to state material facts in both sections 11 and 12
as a basis for liability.
Under both the Securities Act and the English Companies Act
the burden 5o has been placed upon the defendant to prove his in-
nocence, but the defenses under the Security Act are more limited
than under the English Act. Especially is this true of the issuer,
who is made practically an insurer. JOHN E. CURBY, '34.
50 Cf., 73d Congress, 1st Sess. H. R., Report No. 85, p. 24. "The com-
mittee has deemed this shift (from the plaintiff to the defendant) just and
necessary inasmuch as the knowledge of the seller as to any flaw in his selling
statements or the failure of the seller to exercise reasonable care are mat-
ters in regard to which the seller may readily testify, but in regard to which
the buyer is seldom in a position to give a convincing proof."
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